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Most  analyses  of  international  differences  in  productivity 
growth present data for OECD countries only. Although defendable 
from  a  data-quality  point  of  view,  this  implies  that  some 
important  industrial  countries  that  have  grown  fast  in  recent 
years are excluded from the analysis. To avoid this outcome the 
present study includes the most important NICs as well. Various 
indicators of economic and technological development and trends 
for the countries included in the analysis are presented. It is 
shown  that  although  some  convergence  takes  place,  there  are 
diverging factors at work as well. The formal model discussed 
above is then estimated on pooled time-series cross-country data 
for the period 1960-1985, and the consequences for analyses of 
international  productivity  differences  and  the  slow-down  in 
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This  paper  focuses  on  the  contribution  of  innovation  and 
diffusion of technology to growth of gdp and productivity. 
 
On  a  theoretical  level,  the  paper  is  an  attempt  to  apply  the 
Schumpeterian  theory  of  innovation-diffusion,  initially 
developed  as  an  analysis  of  firm  behaviour,  to  macro-economic 
growth. This application of the theory may be justified on two 
grounds. First, macro-economic data are made from micro-economic 
ones. To the extent that innovation-diffusion explains growth at 
the micro level, it should be expected to do so at the macro 
level as well. Second, nations are more than just statistical 
aggregates. The economic units that nations consist of are tied 
together  by  strong  cultural,  institutional  and  economic  ties. 
Although  increasingly  contested  by  the  trend  towards 
transnationalization,  nation-specific  factors  continue  to 
significantly  influence  all  aspects  of  economic  activity, 
including  the  technological  ones.
i  An  obvious  example  of  the 
importance of national factors, including technology policies, 
for  technological  and  industrial  change  is  of  course  Japan 
(Freeman, 1987), but similar - although often less flattering - 
examples may be found for other countries.  
 
As emphasized by Schumpeter himself, his theory is confined to 




few if any examples of important industrialized market economies 
outside the OECD area. This is no longer so. Several non-OECD 
countries  compete  today  successfully  in  the  international 
markets for manufacturing products. To exclude these countries 
from  the  investigation  would  be  to  overlook  some  of  the  most 
dynamic actors in the industrialized world today. This could, in 
turn, lead to wrong or biased conclusions on the determinants of 
growth  of  gdp  and  productivity  in  the  industrialized  world. 
Although  problematic  from  a  data-quality  point  of  view,  this 
paper  attempts  to  include  the  most  important  industrialized 
market  economies  from  the  non-OECD  area,  the  so-called  NIC's, 
into the investigation. 
 
The  structure  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  The  next  section 
develops  a  formal  model  of  economic  growth  based  on  the 
theoretical framework of the paper, followed by a discussion of 
data  on  technological  levels  and  trends.  Then  the  model  is 
applied to a pooled cross-country time-series data set including 
data for 25 countries between 1960 and 1985. The final section 
contains summary and conclusions. 
 
A Technology Gap Theory of Economic Growth 
 
Essentially, the technology-gap theory of economic growth is an 
application  of  Schumpeter's  dynamic  theory  of  capitalist 




world  economy  characterized  by  competing  capitalist  nation-
states.  Following  Schumpeter,  the  technology  gap  theorists
ii 
analyse  economic  development  as  a  disequilibrium  process 
characterized  by  the  interplay  of  two  conflicting  forces: 
Innovation, which tends to increase economic and technological 
differences between countries, and imitation or diffusion which 
tends  to  reduce  them.  Whether  a  country  behind  the  world 
innovation  frontier  succeeds  in  reducing  the  productivity  gap 
vis-a-vis the frontier countries, does not only depend on its 
imitative efforts, but also on its innovative performance, and 
on the innovative performance of the frontier countries. Even if 
a country behind the world innovation frontier may succeed in 
reducing  the  productivity  gap  through  mainly  imitating 
activities,  it  cannot  surpass  the  frontier  countries  in 
productivity  without  passing  them  in  innovative  activity  as 
well. In general, the outcome of the international process of 
innovation and diffusion - with regard to the development levels 
of different countries - is uncertain. The process may generate 
a pattern where countries follow diverging trends, as well as a 
pattern where countries converge towards a common mean.  
 
Assume  that  the  level  of  production  in  a  country  (Y)  is  a 
multiplicative function of the level of knowledge
iii diffused to 
the country from abroad (Q), the level of knowledge created in 
the  country  (T),  the  country's  capacity  for  exploiting  the 




created, and a constant (Z): 
 
(4) Y =  Z Q
aT
bC
e , where Z is a constant. 
 
By differentiating and dividing through with Y: 
 
(5) dY = a dQ + b dT + e dC 
     Y     Q      T     C  
Assume further, as customary in the diffusion literature, that 
the diffusion of internationally available knowledge follows a 
logistic curve. This implies that the contribution of diffusion 
of internationally available knowledge to economic growth is an 
increasing function of the distance between the total level of 
knowledge appropriated in the country and that of the country on 
the  technological  frontier(  for  the  frontier  country,  this 
contribution will be zero). Let the total amount of knowledge, 
adjusted for differences in size of countries, in the frontier 
country  and  the  country  under  consideration  be  Qf  and  Q*, 
respectively. Then: 
 
(6) dQ/Q = h - h Q*/Qf 
 
By substituting (6) into (5) we finally arrive at: 
 
(7) dY = ah - ah Q* + b dT + e dC 
     Y          Qf      T     C  






- The diffusion of technology from abroad. The contribution of 
this  factor  increases  with  the  distance  from  the  world 
innovation frontier. 
 
- The growth in nationally produced knowledge. 
 
-  The  growth  in  the  country's  capacity  for  exploiting  the 
benefits offered by available technology, whether created within 
the country or elsewhere. 
 
To what extent can this model be extended to cover productivity 
growth  as  well?  According  to  Schumpeter  the  forces  that 
determine growth of production determine growth of productivity 
too
iv, and this is what we will assume here. However, this may 
also  be  justified  on  other  grounds.  For  instance,  Kaldor  has 
repeatedly  argued  that  growth  in  labour  productivity  (dP/P) 
should  be  expected  to  be  determined  by  growth  in  production 
(dY/Y) through the so-called "Verdoorn law":
v  
 
(8) dP/P = m + n dY/Y,  where  n>0 (economies of scale). 
 
By substituting this equation into equation (7) we arrive at: 
 
(9) dP = m + nah - nah Q* + nb dT + ne dC , 




which has the same structure as (7).   
 
The technology-gap model of economic growth developed above does 
of course present a very simplified picture of reality. To do 
full  justice  to  the  Schumpeterian  theory  outlined  above,  the 
world economy should be modelled both from the technology side, 
characterized  by  creation,  diffusion  and  contraction  of 
competing technological systems, and from the side of competing 
nation-states,  characterized  by  different  technological  levels 
and  trends,  institutional  settings,  and  internal  structural 
disequilibria. Admittedly, the model developed here is far from 
meeting  these  requirements.
vi  However,  the  model  differs  from 
the  one  which  until  now  has  dominated  most  empirical  work  on 
technological  gaps  and  economic  growth
vii  in  at  least  one 
respect,  it  incorporates  the  effects  of  national  innovative 
performance. As pointed out by Pavitt(1979/1980) and Pavitt and 
Soete(1982),  the  omission  of  the  innovation  variable  in  most 
applied  work  makes  it  difficult  to  explain  diverging  trends, 
whether represented by laggards, or related to the question of 




In the preceding section, we defined two concepts related to a 
country's level of economic and technological development, the 




the level of knowledge created within the country(T).  
 
The first concept (Q*) refers to the total set of techniques in 
use  in  the  country,  whether  invented  within  the  country,  or 
diffused  to  the  country  from  the  international  economic 
environment.  Q*  cannot  be  measured  directly.  What  can  be 
measured,  is  the  resources  associated  with  the  use  of  these 
techniques  ("technology-input-measures")  or  the  output  of  the 
process in which these techniques are used("technology-output-
measures").  Of  the  former  type,  expenditures  on  education, 
research and development(R&D) and employment of scientists and 
engineers  may  be  mentioned.  But  these  data  are  often  of  low 
quality or do not exist at all, especially in the case of non-
OECD countries. Indeed, regular time series from the early 1960s 
onwards exist for a small group of OECD countries only. Of the 
latter type, data on patents and productivity may be mentioned. 
However,  since  patents  primarily  reflect  innovative  (or 
inventive) activity, not imitation, patent-based measures give 
biased estimates of the level of technological development for 
countries which rely mainly on imitation (Fagerberg, 1988b). We 
have,  therefore,  chosen  to  use  a  productivity-based  measure, 
Real GDP per capita, as a proxy for Q*. Since, current prices 
and  exchange-rates  are  known  to  produce  downward  biased 
estimates of Real GDP per capita for countries with productivity 
levels well below the world productivity frontier, we adjusted 




obtained  by  the  "United  Nations  International  Comparison 
Project".
viii      
 
The second concept(T) refers to the amount of technology created 
within the country, or its domestic "technology base" as opposed 
to  its  use  of  "imported  technology".  We  will  label  this 
"national  technological  activity".  This  cannot  be  measured 
directly either. The most obvious proxies are R&D and patents. 
R&D reflects to some degree both innovation and imitation, since 
a  certain  scientific  base  is  a  precondition  for  successful 
imitation  in  most  areas(Freeman(1982),  Mansfield(1982)),  while 
patents    primarily  reflect  innovation,  not  imitation. 
Furthermore,  R&D  data  do  as  noted  not  exist  for  several 
countries  and  time  spans  covered  by  our  investigation.  Thus, 
patents  will  be  used.  To  avoid  bias  caused  by  differences  in 
patent  regulations  across  countries,  the  analysis  will  be 
confined to applications for patents by non-residents (external 
patent applications) in all countries reporting to WIPO.
ix   
 
There  is,  however,  one  serious  problem  related  to  the  use  of 
time series on patents. In 1978 two new international channels 
for  filing  patent  applications,  one  European  and  one 
international,  were  added  to  the  already  existing  national 
channels. There has always been some element of "economies of 
scale" in filing patent applications for the same invention in 




this  factor  increased.  Earlier  the  applicant  had  to  apply 
separately in each market. Now it became possible to file the 
application in one market and simultaneously get is registered 
as  an  application  in  other  markets  as  well  (so  called 
"designations")  at  a  small  cost.  Thus,  we  should  expect  the 
number  of  external  patent  applications  filed  through  all 
channels combined to be inflated somewhat. As shown in Figure 1, 
the  total  number  of  external  patent  applications  per  capita 
filed through all channels combined (WIPO+EPO+PCT) grew rapidly 
from  1978  onwards  (while  the  number  of  external  patent 
applications per capita filed through the traditional national 
channels  (WIPO)  continued  to  decline).  But  we  cannot  conclude 
from  this  that  the  recorded  increase  in  external  patent 
applications  from  1978  onwards  is  totally  artificial.  In  fact 
also  R&D  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  grew  rapidly  during  the  same 
period  (Figure  2).  Earlier  studies  have  shown  that  R&D  as 
percentage  of  GDP  and  the  number  of  external  patent 
applications,  suitably  deflated,  are  closely  correlated  both 
across  countries  and  over  time  (Fagerberg  1987,  1988b).  This 
leads  us  to  believe  that  there  has  been  an  increase  in  the 
underlying  level  of  national  technological  activity  from  the 
late  1970s  onwards  (although  not  so  strong  as  the  recorded 
increase  in  external  patent  applications  through  all  channels 
combined may indicate). 
 




applications have been present, an international one (PCT) and 
an European one (EPO). The empirically most relevant, however, 
is the latter. This introduces the possibility that the changes 
in  patent  regulations  during  this  period  have  affected  the 
European  countries  more  strongly  than  other  countries,  since 
European firms naturally are more inclined to use an improved 
facility  for  filing  patents  in  Europe  than  firms  from  other 
continents.  To  illustrate  this,  consider  the  regression  below 
between  growth  in  total  external  patent  applications  through  
all  sources  combined  (TOTAL)  as  the  dependent  variable,  and 
growth in external patent applications through the traditional 
national sources (WIPO), a dummy for the European countries, a 
dummy for the Non-European developed countries and a dummy for 
the NIC's as independent variables. The period is 1977-85 and 
95% confidence-intervals are reported in brackets. 
 
 
TOTAL  = 0.94 WIPO + 10.8 EUROPE + 8.5 OTHERDEVELOPED + 4.1 NIC 
        (0.76/1.12) (9.0/12.7)    (5.8/11.2)         (1.6/6.5) 
 
                   
 
                  R
2  =  0.85  (0.81)
   
                     SER= 2.91 
 










This result clearly confirms that the new channels are used much 
more extensively by the European countries (and to some extent 
other developed countries as well) than by the NIC countries. 
Thus,  to  use  the  data  without  any  kind  of  adjustment  would 
probably  introduce  a  bias  both  across  countries  and  through 
time. We, therefore, decided to adjust the data by assuming that 
the "value" of one designation through EPO or PCT is equal to 
one half of a patent application filed through the traditional 
national  channels.  The  adjusted  number  of  external  patent 
applications still showed an upward trend between 1979 and 1985, 
around  3  per  cent  per  year  as  an  annual  average,  which  was 
around one half of the recorded increase without adjustment, but 
roughly the same as the average annual rate of growth in R&D as 
a percentage of GDP. 
 
As in most other studies, the investment share(INV) was chosen 
as  an  indicator  of  the  growth  of  the  capacity  to  exploit  the 
benefits of technology, whether domestically created or diffused 
to  the  country  from  abroad.    This  is,  of  course,  a 
simplification  since  social  and  institutional  factors  are 
obviously  very  important  for  imitation  and  the  associated 
structural  changes  to  take  place  (Abramovitz,  1986).  But  the 
share of investment may also be seen as the outcome of a process 
in  which  social  and  institutional  factors  take  part,  i.e. 
differences  in  the  size  of  the  investment  share  reflect 




Testing the model  
 
The  model  was  tested  on  pooled  cross-country  time-series  data 
for 25 countries for the period 1961-85. Average values of the 
variables covering entire business cycles were calculated, using 
the "peak" years 1968, 1973, 1979 and 1985 to separate one cycle 
from the next. This method, which was first used by Cripps and 
Tarling(1973),  has  been  used  in  a  number  of  studies  on 
international differences in growth and productivity, including 
Cornwall(1976,1977), Cappelen et.al.(1984) and Michl(1985).  The 
main  argument  in  favour  of  the  method  is  that  it  eliminates 
short-run  fluctuations  in  the  data,  thereby  facilitating  the 
analysis of medium and long run dynamics. 
 
Three  different  versions  of  the  model  were  tested.  Model  I 
(basic model) is the one outlined earlier, while the second and 
third model allow for the inclusion of an additional variable 
reflecting  changes  in  the  macro-economic  conditions  from  one 
time period to the next. Model II tests for the hypothesis that 
the  growth  of  the  countries  included  in  the  sample  was 
significantly  affected  by  the  changes  in  terms  of  trade  of 
industrialized  countries  during  the  period  (terms-of-trade 
shock), while model III introduces the growth in world demand as 
a possible explanatory factor (demand shock). The latter is in 
accordance  with  the  view,  put  forward  by  Maddison(1982)  and 




explained    by  too  "cautious"  economic  policies.    It  may  be 
regarded,  then,  as  a  more  "Keynesian"  version  of  the  general 
technology gap model. 
  
A special problem related to use of pooled data in regression 
analyses  concerns  the  possibility  autocorrelation  in  the 
residuals of each cross-sectional unit. When this occurs, it is 
often an indication of left-out variables. If these cannot be 
identified, it is common to adjust the data for the part of the 
total  variance  that  can  be  attributed  to  left-out,  country-
specific factors. Several methods are available, including the 
use  of  first  differences,  country-specific  dummy  variables 
("fixed effects models") and variance-components models ("random 
effects models").
x The problem, of course, with these methods is 
that  a  large  part  of  the  total  variance  is  left  out  of  the 
investigation  and  attributed  to  unknown,  country-specific 
factors. In this paper we have chosen the following procedure. 
To test for autocorrelation within the cross-sectional units we 
applied  the  Durbin-Watson  statistics  adjusted  for  gaps
xi.  If 
found to be significant, we identified the countries responsible 
for this, and applied a forward search by adding country-dummies 
to the equation one by one on the basis of their contribution to 
the estimated degree of autocorrelation. In each case the best 
model was assumed to be the one with least variance. 
 
The countries included




Australia, New Zealand, Germany (Federal Republic of), France, 
United  Kingdom,  Italy,  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  the 
Netherlands,  Norway,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  Finland,  Ireland, 
Spain,  Brazil,  Argentina,  Mexico,  Hong  Kong,  Taiwan  and  Korea 
(Republic of).  
 
The following variables were used:
xiii 
 
GDP = growth of gross domestic product in country i at constant 
prices, 
 
PROD = growth of labour productivity in country i (defined as 
growth of gdp less growth of employment), 
 
TG    =  gross  domestic  product  per  capita  in  country  i    at 
constant  1980  market  prices,  adjusted  for  differences  in 
purchasing power of currencies, relative to the most developed 
country of the sample (range 0 - 1), 
  
PAT = growth of patent applications from residents of country i 
in other countries (external patent applications), adjusted, 
 
INV = gross fixed investment in country i as a percentage of GDP 
at constant prices, 
 





TERMS  =  growth  of  terms  of  trade  for  industrialized  market 
economies. 
 
The results are given in table 1. The first two regressions in 
the table report the results for the basic technology gap model 
outlined earlier. In both cases the coefficients turned up with 
the expected signs significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level.  However,  the  Durbin-Watson  statistics  indicates  auto-
correlation in the residuals of the cross-sectional units. The 
next four regressions test the hypotheses of terms of trade and 
world demand as additional explanatory factors. Both hypotheses 
are supported, but the versions with world demand included have 
higher  fits.  However,  autocorrelation  continues  to  pose 
problems.  The  last  six  regressions,  then,  report  results  when 
dummies  are  included.  Again,  the  model  with  world  demand 
included is the most satisfactory when care is taken to the test 
for  autocorrelation  and  the  degree  of  explanation.  Due  to 
limitations  of  space,  we  do  not  report  the  results  for  the 
country  dummies.  However,  the  general  impression  is  that  the 
estimated coefficients are relatively robust to inclusion of new 
variables. The most notable difference is that the impact of the 











GDP = 1.97 - 5.08TG + 0.13PAT + 0.19INV            R
2=0.58(0.56) 
      (1.26)  (0.83)   (0.03)    (0.05)            SER=1.62 
       ***      *        *         *               DW(73)=1.33 
                                                   N=98 
 
PROD = 0.66 - 1.75TG + 0.11PAT + 0.13INV         R
2=0.40(0.38) 
       (1.11)  (0.75)   (0.03)    (0.04)           SER=1.52 
                **        *         *           DW(73)=1.17 
                                                   N=98 
 
Testing for other factors 
 
 
GDP = 2.01-4.75TG+0.09PAT+0.23INV+0.62TERMS        R
2=0.64(0.62) 
     (1.11)(0.76) (0.03)  (0.04)   (0.16)          SER=1.51 
       ***    *      *       *        *            DW(73)=1.33 
                                                   N=98 
 
PROD = 0.36-2.00TG+0.07PAT+0.13INV+0.68TERMS       R
2=0.52(0.50) 
     (1.01)(0.68) (0.02)  (0.04)   (0.14)          SER=1.37 
              *      *       *        *            DW(73)=1.13 
                                                   N=98 
 
GDP = 0.35 - 4.39TG + 0.11PAT + 0.18INV + 0.37W    R
2=0.75(0.74) 
     (0.95)  (0.63)   (0.02)    (0.04)    (0.05)   SER=1.26 
                *        *         *         *     DW(73)=1.35 
                                                   N=98 
 
PROD = -1.04 - 1.64TG + 0.09PAT + 0.12INV +0.32W   R
2=0.62(0.60) 
       (0.93)  (0.61)   (0.02)    (0.04)  (0.04)   SER=1.22 
                 *        *         *        *     DW(73)=1.10 


















a = 3.01 - 5.61TG + 0.11PAT + 0.20INV            R
2=0.68(0.66) 
     (1.11)  (0.81)   (0.03)    (0.04)             SER=1.44 
       *        *        *         *               DW(73)=1.58 
                                                   N=98 
 
PROD
b =  1.34 - 3.06TG + 0.09PAT + 0.14INV         R
2=0.57(0.52) 
       (1.14)  (0.84)   (0.02)    (0.03)           SER=1.34 
                  *        *         *           DW(73)=1.45 





a = 2.74-6.00TG+0.06PAT+0.24INV+0.67TERMS        R
2=0.75(0.73) 
     (0.99)(0.73) (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.14)           SER=1.29 
       *     *      *       *        *             DW(73)=1.75 
                                                   N=98 
 
PROD
b = 1.31-3.58TG+0.04PAT+0.19INV+0.72TERMS       R
2=0.70(0.66) 
      (0.97)(0.71) (0.02)  (0.03)   (0.12)         SER=1.13 
              *      *       *         *           DW(73)=1.58 






a = 1.15 - 5.44TG + 0.08PAT + 0.18INV + 0.37W    R
2=0.86(0.84) 
      (0.77) (0.55)   (0.02)    (0.03)   (0.04)    SER=0.97 
                *       *          *        *      DW(73)=2.11 
                                                   N=98 
 
PROD
b = -0.18 - 3.05TG + 0.07PAT + 0.13INV + 0.32W  R
2=0.78(0.75) 
       (0.83)  (0.60)   (0.02)    (0.03)   (0.04)  SER=0.96 
                *        *         *        *      DW(73)=1.72 
                                                   N=98 
Notes 
a) Includes dummies for USA, Canada, Argentina and Hong Kong. 




Australia, Argentina and Mexico.   
 
*   = Significant at a  1% level(two-tailed test) 
**  = Significant at a  5% level(two-tailed test) 
*** = Significant at a 10% level(two-tailed test) 
R
2 in brackets = R
2 adjusted for degrees of freedom 
SER = Standard error of regression 
DW(N) = Durbin Watson adjusted for gaps 
N = number of observations included in the test 
Standard deviation of estimate in brackets. 
 
 
Table 2 presents a calculation of estimated and actual growth 
for the average country of the sample, and table 3 presents a 
similar  calculation  for  growth  of  labour  productivity.  The 
calculations are based on equation (7) and (9),
xiv respectively, 
and the coefficients are taken from the six last regressions of 
table 1 (with dummies). The pure technology gap model (model I) 
is  shown  to  predict  a  slowdown  in  growth  of  gdp  and  labour 
productivity of around one third of what actually occurred. The 
inclusion of changes in terms of trade (model II) improves the 
prediction for the 1973-79 period, but this model too fails to 
predict the slow growth of gdp and labour productivity in the 
most  recent  period.    The  model  with  growth  of  world  demand 
included  (model  III),  in  contrast,  fits  the  data  quite  well. 




slowdown in growth of gdp and productivity should be attributed 
to technological factors, the remaining being due to variations 
in demand. 
 
Thus, the general conclusion is that when the demand variable is 
excluded,  the  model  fails  to  predict  more  than  a  part  of  the 
actual  slow-down  in  growth  of  gdp  and  productivity.  This  is 
especially  so  for  the  most  recent  period.  Table  4  presents  a 
test of the hypothesis that the data from the most recent period 
are  not  generated  by  the  same  model  as  the  data  from  earlier 
periods for the models used in the preceding tables. The results 
suggest  that  we  should  accept  the  hypothesis  of  structural 
change when changes in terms of trade are included as one of the 
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  TABLE 2. GROWTH DECOMPOSED
a 
 
Model I:         
      1960-68  1968-73  1973-79   1979-85  Change 
                  I        II     III     IV    IV-I 
Contribution 
from:   
  Diffusion       1.9      2.0       1.8      1.7    -0.2   
  Innovation     0.8      0.4       0.1      0.3    -0.5 
  Investment
b     2.0      2.2       2.3      1.8    -0.2  
Growth (est.)    4.7      4.6       4.1      3.8    -0.9 
Growth (act.)    5.2      5.8       3.5      2.4    -2.8 
Residual
c         0.5      1.2      -0.6    -1.4     
 
Model II:        
      1960-68  1968-73  1973-79  1979-85  Change 
                     I        II     III     IV    IV-I 
Contribution 
from: 
  Diffusion       2.0      2.1       1.9      1.8    -0.2   
  Innovation      0.4      0.2       0.0      0.2    -0.2 
  Investment
b     2.3      2.6       2.7      2.1    -0.2  
  Terms of trade  0.4      0.0     -1.5     -0.5    -0.9 
Growth (est.)    5.1      4.9       3.1      3.6    -1.5 
Growth (act.)    5.2      5.8       3.5      2.4    -2.8 
Residual
c            0.1      0.9       0.4    -1.2     
 
Model III:         
      1960-68  1968-73  1973-79  1979-85  Change 
                       I        II     III     IV    IV-I 
Contribution 
from: 
  Diffusion       1.8      1.9       1.7      1.7    -0.1   
  Innovation      0.5      0.3       0.0      0.2    -0.3 
  Investment
b     2.2      2.3       2.4      1.9    -0.3  
  Demand
d      0.6      1.3     -0.9     -1.2    -1.8    
Growth (est.)    5.1      5.9       3.3      2.6    -2.5 
Growth (act.)    5.2      5.8       3.5      2.4    -2.8 
Residual
c         0.1     -0.1       0.2    -0.2     
 
Notes 
a) Columns do not always add due to rounding. 
b) Including the constant term. 
c) Actual growth less estimated growth.  
d) Assumed to be zero for all four periods combined (1960-86). 
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  TABLE 3. GROWTH OF LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY DECOMPOSED
a 
 
Model I:         
      1960-68  1968-73  1973-79  1979-85  Change 
                  I       II     III     IV    IV-I 
Contribution from: 
  Diffusion       1.0      1.1       1.0      0.9    -0.1   
  Innovation     0.6      0.3       0.0      0.3    -0.3 
  Investment
b     1.5      1.7       1.7      1.4    -0.1  
Productivity 
Growth (estimated)  3.2      3.1       2.7      2.7    -0.5 
Productivity 
Growth (actual)    4.0      4.2       2.2      1.7    -2.3 
Residual
c         0.8      1.2      -0.5    -0.9     
 
Model II:     
      1960-68  1968-73  1973-79  1979-85  Change 
                      I        II     III     IV    IV-I 
Contribution from: 
  Diffusion       1.2      1.3       1.1      1.1    -0.2   
  Innovation      0.3      0.2       0.0      0.1    -0.2 
  Investment
b     2.1      2.3       2.3      1.9    -0.2  
  Terms of trade  0.4      0.0     -1.6     -0.5    -0.9    
Productivity 
Growth (estimated)  4.0      3.7       1.9      2.6    -1.4 
Productivity 
Growth (actual)    4.0      4.2       2.2      1.7    -2.3 
Residual
c         0.0      0.5       0.2    -1.0     
 
Model III:       
      1960-68  1968-73  1973-79  1979-85  Change 
                     I        II     III     IV    IV-I 
Contribution from: 
  Diffusion       1.0      1.1       1.0      0.9    -0.1   
  Innovation      0.5      0.3       0.0      0.2    -0.3 
  Investment
b     1.7      1.8       1.9      1.6    -0.1  
  Demand
d      0.6      1.2     -0.7     -1.0    -1.6    
Productivity 
Growth (estimated)  3.8      4.4       2.2      1.7    -2.1 
Productivity 
Growth (actual)    4.0      4.2       2.2      1.7    -2.3 
Residual
c         0.2     -0.2       0.0    0.0     
 
Notes 
a) Columns do not always add due to rounding. 
b) Including the constant term. 
c) Actual productivity growth less estimated productivity growth. 
d) Assumed to be zero for all four periods combined (1960-86).  
 
  24 
 
  TABLE 4. TEST FOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE (CHOW-TEST) 
 
      GDP        Productivity 
 
Model I    F(25,65) = 2.00    F(25,65) = 1.29 
Model II    F(25,64) = 2.76
*  F(25,61) = 2.13
* 
Model III   F(25,64) = 0.94    F(25,61) = 0.76 
 
*  = Acceptance of structural change, 1 % level 
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Concluding remarks 
 
This  paper  has  focused  on  the  contribution  of  innovation  and 
diffusion of technology to growth of gdp and productivity. The 
results  confirm  that  both  the  scope  for  imitation,  growth  in 
national technological activities and increases in the capital 
stock have a significant impact on growth of gdp and productivity. 
This is consistent with earlier findings that a large part of the 
differences  in  growth  between  industrialized  countries  in  the 
post-war  period  can  be  explained  by  these  factors  (Fagerberg,  1987, 
1988b).  
 
However, technological factors are mainly of a long run nature and 
should  not  be  expected  to  explain  large  short-  or  medium-run 
variations in the growth of gdp and productivity. This is also 
confirmed.  In  fact,  according  to  the  calculations  presented  in  this 
paper, less than one third of the actual slow-down in growth of gdp 
and productivity after 1973 can be explained by technology, the 
remaining being due to demand and other factors.  
 
Thus, the results reported in this paper do not support the view
xv 
that a large slowdown in productivity growth was to be expected in 
the  1970s  due  to  a  reduced  technology  gap.  This,  of  course,  does  not 
imply  that  this  factor  has  not  been  of  importance  for  many  developed 
countries.  But  as  these  countries  approached  the  technology 
frontier,  other,  less  developed,  countries  joined  the 
industrialized world. For these countries, the prospects for high  
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growth through exploitation of the technology gap continued to be 
high, provided that the macro-economic conditions of the world 
economy were of a kind that made this process possible. However, in 
contrast  with  the  1950s  and  1960s,  when  high  growth  in  demand,  ample 
credit and trade liberalization went hand in hand, the early 1980s 
have witnessed slow growth in demand, tightening of credit and 
increasing protectionism via a vis countries in the process of 
industrialization. The findings of this paper are consistent with 
the  view  that  these  changes  in  global  macro-economic  conditions  have 
significantly  retarded  the  growth  of  industrializing  countries  and, 
through repercussions, also the growth of countries on a higher 
level development.  
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Growth rates are calculated as geometric averages for the periods 
1960-68, 1968-73, 1973-79 and 1979-85, or the nearest period for 
which data exist. Levels and shares are calculated as arithmetic 
averages for the periods 1960-67, 1968-73, 1974-79 and 1980-85, or 






a) Real GDP per capita, 1980 market prices in US $: 
 
Taiwan: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 
 
Other countries: IMF International Financial Statistics 
 
 
b) Growth of gross domestic product, at constant prices, Growth of 
civilian employment and Gross investment as share of GDP: 
 
OECD-countries: OECD Historical Statistics 
 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea 1960-73: Chen, E.K (1979)  
  Hyper-growth in Asian Economies London: MacMillan 
 
Taiwan 1973-85: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 
 
 
Hong Kong and Korea (1973-85),  
  IMF International Financial Statistics and United Nations 
  Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific (Growth of GDP 
  and Investment as a share of GDP) 
  ILO  Yearbook  of  Labour  Statistics  and  World  Bank  World 
  Tables (Growth of civilian employment)     
   
 
Mexico, Argentina and Brazil: 
  IMF International Financial Statistics (Growth of GDP and 
Investment as a share of GDP) 
  United Nations Statistical Yearbook for the Latin America 
  and the Caribbean (Growth of civilian employment) 
     
The employment data for the non-OECD countries are generally not of 
the  same  quality  as  the  OECD  data.  Different  sources  may  imply  large  
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differences in the calculated growth rates. The data for Hong Kong 
and  Korea  are  estimates  based  on  the  available  sources.  The  data  for 
Mexico, Argentina and Brazil are based on data for economically 
active population between 15 and 64 of age adjusted for changes in 
the unemployment rate (where known). 
 
c) External patent applications: 
 
OECD countries: OECD/STIIU DATA BANK 
 
Other countries: World International Property Organization(WIPO): 
  Industrial Property Statistics and unpublished data.    
 
Data for the non-OECD countries are compiled from published WIPO 
statistics  except  for  Hong  Kong,  Korea  and  Taiwan  1975-85  where  data 
are compiled by WIPO from unpublished sources. For Ireland, Spain, 
Brazil,  Argentina,  Mexico  and  Hong  Kong  the  data  for  the  first  period 
are for the years 1964-68. For Korea and Taiwan the data for the 
second  and  third  periods  are  for  1969-75  and  1975-79,  respectively. 
 
d) R&D as percentage of GDP: 
 
OECD countries: OECD/STIIU DATA BANK 
 
e) Growth of world trade at constant prices: 
 
The growth of total OECD imports was used as proxy. The data were 
taken from: OECD Historical Statistics 
 
f) Growth of terms of trade of industrialized countries:  
   
IMF International Financial Statistics (growth of export    
unit values less growth of import unit values)  
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  NOTES 
   
i. Lundvall (1988) has coined the concept "national system of 
innovation"  to  characterize  the  systematic  impact  of 
nation-specific factors on technological and industrial change. 
ii. The major contributors to the development of the "Technology 
Gap Theory" have been Gomulka(1971) and Cornwall(1976,1977), but 
the  main  arguments  were  outlined  much  earlier  by  Posner(1961),  even 
if Posner's main concern was specialization, not growth. 
iii .  In  the  present  context,  knowledge  means  "technological 
know-how"  (knowledge  and  skills  on  how  to  produce  goods  and 
services). 
iv .  According  to  Schumpeter,  innovation-diffusion  creates  new 
demand and production, and this new demand creates new employment. 
".. for the new demand, first of the entrepreneur and then of those 
who extend operations (..) is, directly and indirectly, chiefly 
demand for labor" (Schumpeter 1934, p.369).   Hence, the basic 
model should be the same. 
v. There is a large literature on this relationship and we will not 
attempt  to  summarize  it  here.  Formally,  this  relation  may  be 
obtained by applying a static Cobb-Douglas production function and 
assuming  a  constant  capital-output  ratio,  in  which  case  the 
coefficient n will be positive, zero or negative depending on 
whether there are increasing, constant or decreasing returns to 
scale  (see,  for  instance,  Rowthorn,  1979).  Kaldor's  own  view, 
however, is that the positive association between productivity 
growth and production growth is not only due to static economies 
scale but also to the fact that higher growth implies a higher rate 
of "learning by doing" (Kaldor, 1966, p. 9-10). 
vi. See Fagerberg (1988a) for an attempt to extend the perspective 
outlined here to cover external trade/competitiveness as well.  
vii.  See  Kendrick  (1981),  Maddison  (1987)  and  Fagerberg  (1988b)  for 
surveys and discussion of previous work in this area. 
viii. This was done by estimating a relation between real gdp 
(nominal  gdp  adjusted  for  differences  in  purchasing  power  of 
currencies) and nominal gdp on the data reported by Kravis et al. 
(1982)  and  using  this  relation  to  predict  real  gdp  for  the  countries 
of our sample. For details, see Fagerberg (1988b) p. 454 (note 19). 
ix. This implies that patent applications by Norwegian citizens in 
Norway, Danish citizens in Denmark etc. are deducted from the total 
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number of patent applications filed in all countries. 
x. For an overview, see chapter 10-3 in Johnston (1984). 
xi. What this implies is that we leave out the differences between 
the  residuals  of  different  cross-sectional  units  and  the 
corresponding  residuals  from  both  the  numerator  and  the 
denominator, thereby reducing the number of observations with one 
per cross sectional unit. 
xii. Because of lack of data, we have only 23 observations for the 
1960-68 period (all countries except Taiwan and Korea), making a 
total of 98 observations. 
xiii. See the appendix for details on definitions and sources. 
xiv .  The  coefficient  "m"  in  equation  (9),  representing 
technological  progress  not  accounted  for  by  diffusion  and 
innovation of technology, is assumed to be zero. 
xv. See, for instance, Marris (1982). 